Press "Enter" to skip to content

Month: August 2020

Whether Section 120(a) limits the copyright protection of a PGS work that is physically connected to an architectural work?

 

January 22, 2018, Adrian Falkner filed civil action, seeking relief for (1) copyright infringement and (2) falsification, removal, and alteration of copyright management information in violation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Defendant moved for summary judgment.

Comments closed

If copyright “is not capable of ‘existing independently’ as a work of art, it is not protectable under copyright law

Lanard makes and sells the “Lanard Chalk Pencil,” which is a toy chalk holder designed to look like a pencil. Lanard owns Design Patent, which contains five figures showing a pencil-shaped chalk holder from different angles. Lanard also owns copyright Reg. for a work entitled “Pencil/Chalk Holder.”

Comments closed

Section 512 report – Notice-and-Takedown Process

OSPs seeking protection under the safe harbors in sections 512(b), (c), or (d), must, in addition to the section 512(i) requirements, maintain a compliant notice-and-takedown process by responding expeditiously to remove or disable access to material claimed to be infringing upon receipt of proper notice from a copyright owner or the owner’s authorized agent.

Comments closed

A copyright sublicense could be implied in the absence of an express grant

Photographic Illustrators Corp. (“PIC”) provides commercial photography services – primarily photos of consumer goods – through its principal photographer, Paul Picone. Osram Sylvania, Inc. (“Sylvania”) is one of the world’s leading manufacturers of lightbulbs. PIC owns valid copyrights to thousands of photographs of Sylvania lightbulbs. Sylvania uses the photos in marketing and selling its products, as do Sylvania’s dealers and distributors.

Comments closed

Which clarifications or revisions would be the most beneficial for improving section 512?

First, the Office recommends that Congress clarify the distinction between “actual knowledge” and “red flag knowledge.” Court decisions interpreting the red flag knowledge provision have often required a level of specificity regarding the types of information from which infringing activity is present as to blur the line between actual and red flag knowledge and conflate the existence of either knowledge type with receipt of a takedown notice from a rightsholder.

Comments closed

Justice Bryer on why booking.com shouldn’t be registered as trademark

The question at issue here is whether a term that takes the form “generic.com” is generic in the ordinary course. In the Breyer’s view, appending “.com” to a generic term ordinarily yields no meaning beyond that of its constituent parts. Because the term “Booking.com” is just such an ordinary “generic.com” term it is not eligible for trademark registration.

Comments closed